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4
TOWARD A METHODOLOGY
FOR MEASURING AND
ASSESSING RACIAL AS
DISTINGUISHED FROM
ETHNIC IDENTITY
Janet E. Helms
University of Maryland at College Park

In the 1970s, as an offshoot of the civil rights movements of that
era, applied psychologists began to grapple with the issues of how to
measure racial and ethnic identity. Given the increased emphasis on
improving the life circumstances of disenfranchised peoples in the
United States, practitioners and applied social and behavioral scientists sought pragmatic strategies for determining how best to intervene in the environments primarily of peoples of color in order to
contribute to positive mental health outcomes for them as well as
society more inclusively (Sue, 1992).
However, as Helms (1990a) noted, the sophistication of theoretical
models and formulations used to explain the psychological effects of
being socialized in racially oppressed and culturally distinct social
groups far outsh'ipped efforts to develop strategies for assessing the
relevant psychological aspects of racism and ethnocenh·icism. Thus, in
her overviews of existing theoretical models that purported to address
aspects of racial or ethnic identity, Helms (1990a, 1990b) located 11
models for African Americans, six for White Americans, two for Asian
Americans, two for Latino/Hispanic Americans, and four for Native
Americans. She also noted that some of the theorists that she reviewed
considered that they had developed models of "ethnic" or "cultural"
identity, whereas others contended that they had developed models of
"racial" identity, although each seemed to be addressing aspects of the
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same societal dynamics of in-group/out-group oppression. In general, it seemed to be the case that theorists who believed that their
own discomfort with race or ethnicity was due to racism and the
resulting racial discord developed theories of racial identity, whereas
theorists who felt that their societal disempowerment was due to
cultural mismatch of some sort developed theories of ethnic identity.
However, problems with this language of convenience are that it
helped to perpetuate the imprecision in terminology in psychological
research when matters of race, ethnicity, or culture are discussed.
Furthermore, such imprecise usage makes it difficult to operationally
define any of the relevant constructs. Consequently, Helms (1994a,
1994b) recommended that identity models be considered "racial"
models if they describe reactions to societal dynamics of "racial"
oppression (i.e., domination or subjugation based on racial or ethnic
physical characteristics commonly assumed to be racial or genetic in
nature). She suggested that identity models be considered "ethnic"
models if acquisition or maintenance of cultural characteristics (e.g.,
language, religious expression) are defining principles.
Each of the models that Helms summarized had in common the
underlying assumption that an in-group racial or ethnic identity was
formed by contrasting oneself and one's societally ascribed racial or
ethnic group against the dominant White group if one was a Person
of Color or the Black group if one was White. Each of the models also
assumed that societal stereotypes and attributions about one's racial
or ethnic group are internalized by each person, and influence his or
her responses to racial or ethnic stimuli. Yet some of the theories
emphasized the intrapsychic processes by which the ingroup /outgroup
comparisons occurred (e.g., stages of development), whereas others
emphasized the outcomes of differential socialization (e.g., personality types). Since Helms's original reviews, the number of theoretical
models for describing the racial identity of each of the racial groups (e.g.,
Sabnani, Ponterotto, & Borodovsky, 1991) as well as various ethnic
groups (e.g., Hutnik, 1991; Phinney, 1990) has continued to proliferate.
However, it is more difficult to count the number of measures of
racial or ethnic identity primarily because there is no clear
conceptualization of what constitutes "measurement" of racial or
ethnic identity, or for that matter, what is meant by "racial" or
"ethnic" identity. In addition, measurement efforts have been hampered by a variety of other problems. Perhaps the most important of
the measurement dilemmas are the absence of an articulated model
for measuring and assessing processes of identity as distinguished
from outcomes, and the lack of common measurement approaches for
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measuring processes in which person-by-environment interactions
are considered to be critical aspects of the process. As a result,
researchers have attempted to force processes that are conceptualized
as operating on an individual person-environment level to conform to
group-level measurement principles (Helms, 1989).
Often the incongruence between conceptual models of racial identity
and the measurement models by which they are operationally defined
has resulted in the misinterpretation or misapplication of classical measurement theory in addressing certain types of measurement issues
common to process-identity measures. The primary purpose of this
paper is to discuss each of these issues as they pertain to measurement
of racial identity as distinguished from etlmic identity.
A second purpose is to propose strategies for increasing the pragmatism of existing racial identity measures. The issue of pragmatism with
respect to racial and etlmic identity measures has been virtually ignored,
even though assessment of identity was the issue that originally fueled
theorists' (e.g., Cross, 1971; Vontress, 1971; Milliones, 1980) efforts to
describe racial and ethnic identity in applied psychology. Pragmatism
refers to usage of such measures to intervene in and/or assist the
assessed person to make decisions about his or her life.
To make this latter point, it is necessary to distinguish "measurement" from "assessment." Aftanas (1994) makes the following distinction: "Assessment is the process of obtaining informa tion that
may be prenumerical, such as identifying that one has more of
something than another person has. There are many different instruments in psychology that give us this information, including human
judgment. When an appropriate method can be found to convert this
information into numerical information, then we can conclude that
measurement has occurred" (Aftanas, 1994, p . 889). Graham and Lily
(1984), who consider the use of standardized tests a part of the
assessment process, further stipulate that assessment ought to provide information that enables the assessor to make and communicate
inferences or predictions about the person being assessed. Although
neither explicitly says so, assessment usually is intended to occur at
the individual level, that is, to have implications for individuals.
Nevertheless, viable racial or ethnic identity strategies for assessing
individuals either do not presently exist, or are not widely known.
Defin itions
Adequate measurement or assessment of either racial or ethnic
identity requires a clear definition of the constructs that one intends
to measure. Helms (1994a, 1994b) noted that in psychological re-
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search, part of the difficulty in operationally defining racial factors in
particular is the ambiguous language used to discuss "racial" and
"race-related" (e.g., ethnic groups, culture) constructs. With respect
to racial and ethnic identity, the measurement problems are further
complicated by the nebulous meaning of "identity." Therefore, it
seems necessary to propose some terminology by which racial and
cultural matters in conjunction with identity might be discussed.
Nevertheless, the proposed terminology is not necessarily intended to
convey the message that there is only one right way to discuss such
matters, because the contemporary lexicon of race and culture-focused language is in such disarray that the only correct usages are
those on which one can obtain some consensus at the time. Thus, the
subsequent definitions are Helms's (1994a) attempt to begin the
discourse concerning development of terminology that is less equivocal. She contends that reduction in the confusion with respect to
terminology will make it possible to increase the conceptual clarity in
the research process where issues of racial and ethnic identity measurement and assessment are concerned.
Prior to Helms's (1994a) observations about the lack of meaningfulness to scientists of commonly used "racial" terms, several authors (e.g.,
Betancourt & Lopez, 1993; Jolmson, 1987; Yee, Fairchild, Weizmann, &
Wyatt, 1993; Shibutani & Kwan, 1965) had noted the tendency of
researchers to collude with society in using concepts such as race, ethnicity
or ethnic group, and culture as though they have a clear common meaning
and are interchangeable. Of this triad, the concept that is most important
for racial identity theory and measurement is the notion of "race" as a
psychological construct, whereas for ethnic identity measurement the
constru,cts of "ethnicity" and "culture" are more germane.
Race

According to Gordon (1976), "Race, technically, refers to differential concentrations of gene frequencies responsible for traits which, so
far as we know, are confined to physical manifestations [phenotypes] such as skin color or hair form; it has no intrinsic
connection with cultural patterns and institutions" (p. 32, italics
added). The obvious implication of Gordon's definition is that
societal racial categories are biologically or genetically defined.
However, many scholars (e.g., Spikard, 1992; Zuckerman, 1990)
have advised that if different biologically determined racial
groups exis t anywhere in the world (a doubtful premise at best),
it is not in the United States where a long history of involuntary and
voluntary cross-group miscegenation has resulted in so-called mutu-
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ally exclusive "racial" groups, which share biological and genetic
ancestry in typically unassessed amounts.
In anthropological, psychological, and medical research as well as
lay society, a person's "racial" category typically has been "measured" by means of crude indicators of phenotypes or physical
appearance (Helms, 1994a; Jackson, 1992; Yee et al., 1993). As is true
of society more generally, preferred indicators in the social and
behavioral sciences have included imprecise "empirical" criteria such
as perceived skincolor, self-reported racial classifications, and researcher racial designations. However, Scarr (1981) notes that phenotypes reveal virtually nothing about a person's underlying "racial"
genetic composition. Offspring of the same set of parents may
demonstrate different phenotypes (e.g., skincolor), whereas offspring
of different parents may exhibit similar phenotypes (e.g., skincolor).
People of the same racial classification may exhibit different phenotypes, whereas people of different racial classifications may exhibit
similar phenotypes (Zuckerman, 1990). Moreover, Jackson (1992)
contends that existing anthropological models have never been adequate for demonstrating the presence of biologically defined racial
differences worldwide, given their frequent assumption that geographic locations differentiate racial populations from one another.
One consequence of the crudeness of measurement of race is that
people who possibly are genetically similar are treated as though they
are different. In other words, racial categories that have no known
valid inclusion criteria (other than legally defined standards and
social custom) become the definers of who is permitted access to
societal resources and define the manner in which such access can
occur (Gotunda, 1991; Takaki, 1993). Helms (1994a) proposes that the
term "sociorace" replace "race" in acknowledgement of the fact that
typically the only criteria used to assign people to racial groups in this
country are socially defined and arbitrary: In other words, racial
classifications are imposed. Be that as it may, at an individual level,
a person's ascribed status in the society initially depends upon the
location on the racial hierarchy of her or his outwardly defined group
(Spikard, 1992).
Racial identity may be broadly defined as the psychological or
internalized consequences of being socialized in a racially oppressive
environment and the characteristics of self that develop in response to
or in synchrony with either benefitting from or suffering under such
oppression. Some theorists (e.g., Vontress, 1971) conceptualize the
characteristics as stable personality "types," whereas others (Hardiman,
1982; Helms, 1986, 1990a, 1995) describe them as "stages,"
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"worldviews," or "ego statuses." The primary focus of this paper is
the racial identity perspectives that purport to examine dynamic
processes such as stages or statuses rather than static pers0l1ality traits
or types. Given the foregoing definition, then the relevant measurement and assessment tasks are to construct measurement devices for
quantifying differential levels or amounts of relevant internalized
oppression-related characteristics, and adapting them for usage at the
individual or person level.
Ethn ic Group and Ethnicity

In an effort to overcome the research limitations that result from
the reification of race as a biological construct, some theorists have
attempted to resolve conceptual ambiguities by substituting the terms
"ethnic group" or "ethnicity" for "race" (e.g., Gordon, 1976; Johnson,
1987). However, this linguistic compromise ignores the importance of
ethnicity as a distinct construct. Ethnicity implies membership in a
particular group. According to The American Heritage Dictionary,
ethnic is defined as "Of or pertaining to a social group within a
cultural and social system that claims or is accorded special status on
the basis of complex, often variable traits including religious, linguistic, ancestral, or physical characteristics" (Morris, 1975, p. 450).
It should be noted that although "physical characteristics" is
included in the definition, in fact, one does not have to share the same
physical attributes to belong to an ethnic group. For example, Casas
(1984) notes that Latinos/Hispanics can be of any racial classification,
even though they may share Spanish cultural heritage. Also, Spikard
(1992) has observed that members of the African-American ethnic
group historically only have needed 1/32 (i.e., "a drop") of presumed
African ancestry in order to be classified as "black."
Moreover, inclusion of presumably visible physical characteristics as
a definer of ethnicity rather than race belies the fact that historically such
information was used to identify people as belonging to different "racial"
groups (see Spikard, 1992; Takaki, 1993). For example, in this regard,
Takaki has noted that for most of their history in this country, Asian
Indians were classified by society as "Caucasian" but not of the White
race. Although ethnic groups may exhibit physical manifestations of
their group-specific culture (e.g., clothing, symbols), these markers typically are not permanent. In most cases, when they are removed, the
person is assumed to be of and is treated by outgroups as though he or
she belongs to the socioracial group he or she most resembles.
Betancourt and Lopez (1993) recommend that "ethnicity [be] used in
reference to groups that are characterized in terms of common national-
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ity [h"ibe, community, or geographical region], culture, or language [of
one's original ancestors in this country]" and share an "ethnic quality or
[group] affiliation ... which is normally characterized in terms of culture"
(p. 631). Thus, the critical ingredients in their conceptualization of
ethnicity is culture. Consequently, from their perspective, "ethnic group"
implies a group whose members are identifiable because of shared
cultural characteristics which can transcend societal racial categories.
Gordon (1976) subsumed a variety of racial and cultural (e.g.,
language, religion) groups under the generic label of "ethnicity." His
justification for doing so was that due to historical experience, each
group shares with the others "a sense of peoplehood" and this group
kinship is recognized in the American lay public's often interchangeable use of racial and cultural terms. However, it can be argued that
not only do people have different internal representations of their
various potential types of groupness or peoplehood, that is, social
categories, but also that these various representations differentially
influence their covert and overt behavior.
With respect to racial identity, for example, the inner sense of
interconnectedness presumably results from the historical circumstances of racial domination or subordination, whereas with respect
to ethnic identity, common cultural socialization is assumed to be the
source of interconnectedness. Thus, presumably, even if societal racial
oppression no longer existed, multiple ethnic groups still might exist
to the extent that different cultural socialization was needed to insure
a people's survival and/or the members of the ethnic group continued to value their own culture.
Moreover, it can be argued that American society conceptualizes
race and ethnicity differently. Hypothetically, ethnicity is something
to be abandoned or blended into a common societal or "American"
melting pot. Therefore, acknowledgement of ethnicity is largely
voluntary, whereas race is not. For example, governmental agencies
such as the Census Bureau only include ethnic-group classifications if
they are requested to do so vociferously enough by the groups who
intend to use the categories (e.g., Takaki, 1993).
Ethnic classifications rarely have differential long-term implications for national social and political policy in and of themselves,
unless specific phenotypes also accompany them. Furthermore,
ethnicity typically is permitted to adapt itself across generations to
conform to environmental conditions. However, race is valued or
devalued according to which group one belongs to, and is considered
to be deep-rooted and life-long, although the number and names of
the groups may change to reflect societal sensitivities. For example,
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the "mulatto" and "coloreds" group designations in the 1870 Census
became "blacks" in later censuses (Spikard, 1992).
Be that as it may, in order to measure or assess ethnicity, the
researcher must measure cultural manifestations in some manner.
Thus, the critical measurement and assessment issues for ethnic
identity theorists are to (a) operationally define the group-specific
culture (i.e., ethnicity) in a manner that visibly distinguishes it from
reactions to racial oppression, and (b) determine the extent to which
the identified culture has been absorbed. Otherwise, ethnicity and
race are merely redundant. Table 1 summarizes the dimensions that
are proposed to differentiate (socio)race from ethnicity.
Culture

Psychological or internalized culture might be defined as those
beliefs, values, customs, traditions, and rituals that are transmitted in
Table 1. Summary of Characteristics That Distingu ish Sociorace From
Ethnicity
Characteri stics
Sociorace

Ethnicity

Defines group members' position
in a societal hi erarchy

Does not define a definite place in a
societal hierarchy

For most people, it is not mutab le

It is mutable for all people

Does not define a single culture

Defines a single culture

Implies know ledge of racism and
own-group racial stereotypes

Implies know ledge of own-group
culture

Determined by law and custom

Determined by in-group desires

For most people, it lasts across
generations

For most people, it virtuall y disappears after three generations

Can generally be recogni zed by
out-g roup members

Can rarely be recogni zed by out-group
members

Does not req uire the person to do
anything to be long

Requires some fam iliarity with
group's cu lture to belong

Does not require infusion of
immigran ts or visits to homeland
to persist

Requires an ongoing infusion of
immigrants or sojourns to a home land
to persist
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some form across successive generations of a group, are present
during critical eras of a person's lifespan socialization, and become a
part of the person's llmer psychological experience. Triandis (1994)
distinguishes between subjective culture (e.g., values), meaning those
aspects of culture that a person learns or ll1corporates as a part of
oneself; and objective culture, meaning the products (e.g., art work)
that typify a particular cultural group. Also, Helms (1994a) distinguishes between metacultures and cultures. Thus, she suggests that the
dOmll1ant culture, that is, the culture to which everyone in a society is
expected to conform, is a metaculture, whereas cultures are the customs
of smaller social groups and communities within the society such as
ethnic groups. In the United States, contemporary Anglo-Saxon culture
is the metaculture (see Alba, 1990; Feagin, 1984; Katz, 1985).
Presumably, familiarity with and competence in one's subjective
culture(s) is the substance of ethnic identity and its measurement.
However, knowledge of or capacity to express a particular culture is
not the essence of racial identity or its measurement, although attitudes and feelings toward or evaluations of group-specific cultures
might be relevant content. In other words, racial identity theorists
usually hypothesize that a person might choose to embrace or reject
a culture assumed to typify one's societally ascribed racial group,
even if he or she has inaccurate knowledge about and/or is not
competent in the culture(s) involved.
Identity

Racial and ethnic identity measurement problems are compounded
by the fact that the term identity has no clear conceptual meaning.
Erikson (1963, 1968) is generally considered to be the personality
theorist who not only made the term identity a watchword in psychology, but also explicitly incorporated the notion of collective identities
(e.g., occupational, gender, religious) into a theoretical formulation.
Thus, he described a developmental process by which a person could
integrate most of his or her various social group memberships into a
healthy personality configuration.
Briefly, Erikson proposed that in general, psychosocial identity
development is characterized by the following four-stage developmental sequence: (a) foreclosure, commitment to specific personal
and group-defined goals, values, or beliefs without ever considering
other alternatives; (b) diffusion, a lack of solid commitments or efforts
to establish them; (c) moratorium, a state of crisis during which a
person explores his or her life options; and (d) achieved, firm social
commitments based on engaging in and resolving personally relevant
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life crises. This portion of his model is relevant to the issue of
measurement and assessment of racial and ethnic identity because
measures derived from this perpective are often used in racial! ethnic
group comparison studies (see Phinney, 1990).
Nevertheless, anticipating future measurement problems, Erikson
complained that identity "is used without explanation as if it were
obvious what it means"; and researchers use terms such as "self-identity" as though they refer to "social roles, personal traits, or conscious
self-images, shunning the less manageable and the less obscure (and
often more sinister [racial]) implications of the concept" (Erikson, 1966/
1976, p. 60). However, for him, identity meant "a subjective sense of
invigorating sameness and continuity" (emphasis in original).
Erikson (1975) proposed that psychosocial identities in particular
were characterized by an individual (Le., intrapsychic) and a communal component. For him, the intrapsychic aspect involved the person's
complex internal experiences in reaction to ingroup and outgroup
socialization relative to a group. A part of this intrapsychic aspect
was "a subjective sense as well as an observable quality of personal
sameness and continuity, paired with some belief in the sameness and
continuity of some shared world image" (p. 18). The communal
component refers to the person's interpersonal relations within his or
her own collective environment(s), where adequate adjustment is
defined as her or his capacity to be integrated into that community by
adequately fulfilling social roles given the relevant historical circumstances. Other social or collective identity theorists (e.g., Tajfel, 1978)
also suggest that communality may refer to the interplay between
majority-status and minority- status groups (i.e., intergroup relations)
and the person's adaptation to those dynamics.
Racial identity theorists tend to emphasize the illtrapersonal or
intrapsychic ramifications of the person's interpersonal and intergroup
conditions of oppression, whereas ethnic identity theorists tend to emphasize interpersonal (e.g, social role fulfillment) and/or intergroup
dynamics (e.g., acculturation). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that racial
identity theorists would choose operational definitions of identity that
permit assessment of internal processes. Similarly, ethnic identity theorists seem apt to use operational definitions that assess the person's fit
within his or her group(s) as well as the metacultural group.
WHAT ARE RAC IAL AND ETHN IC IDENTITY?

Although Erikson (1968) perhaps introduced the notion of racial
classification (specifically, membership in the "American Negro" and
"white majority" groups) as critical aspects of personal identity devel-
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opment, he did not include it as a potential source of identity enhancement. In addition, although his theoretical framework has been used
so far to discuss the conceptual difficulties in measuring and assessing
racial and ethnic identity, it would be fallacious to consider his work
to be a direct ancestor of most contemporary racial and ethnic identity
theorists because judging from the absence of citations of his work in
most of their reference lists, it is unlikely that these theorists were
aware of his work. Rather, it is more appropriate to suggest that racial
identity theories are in the genre of Erikson.
Be that as it may, later theorists (e.g., Cross, 1971; Thomas, 1971)
began to conceptualize racial identity as a developmental process that
potentially had positive as well as negative implications for visible
racial/ethnic group (VREG) individuals residing in the United States
as well as members of the White majority group. Originally, theorists
who conceptualized racial identity as involving a developmental
process used the construct of "stages" to describe the process. However, Helms (1995) has suggested that "ego statuses" be used instead
because it is more consistent with theoretical descriptions of the
developmental process as involving not necessarily obvious or conscious intrapsychic person-environment dynamics that are central to
the person's racial self-conception. As previously mentioned, Helms
(1990a; 1990b) summarizes many of these models. Also, Phinney
(1990) reviewed empirical studies of racial and ethnic identity, although she does not differentiate between the two. However, the
racial identity models that have generated the most measures (Helms,
1984; Helms, 1990; Helms & Carter, 1990; Parham & Helms, 1981) and
measurement controversy (e.g., Ponterotto & Wise, 1987; Tokar &
Swanson, 1991; Swanson, Tokar, & Davis, 1994) are those developed
by Helms and her associates. Therefore, it might be useful to slUmnarize
briefly the basic principles of her racial identity conceptual models, and
discuss some measurement implications for development or evaluation
of the Black (Helms & Parham, 1985) and White (Helms & Carter, 1990)
racial identity measures, the measures whose psychometric soundness
has been challenged most frequently. Also, conceptual models and
measures of ethnic identity will be briefly discussed to permit consideration of the possibility that racial and etlmic identity might be better
served by different measurement models.
General Principles of Racial Identity

Racial identity theory and consequently, racial identity measurement deals with the psychological consequences to individuals of
being socialized in a society in which a person is either privileged (i.e.,

154

HELMS

White identity) or disadvantaged (e.g., Black and other People of
Color identity) because of her or his racial classification. Thus, the
biological or genetic realities or illusions of race are not relevant
aspects of racial identity conceptualizations. Rather, the focus is on
examining the person's internalized reactions to being treated as
though he or she belongs to a "real" racial group. Thus, in the United
States, members of the Asian, Black, Latino/a, Native, and White
American groups are typically treated in society as though they
belong to different mutually exclusive racial groups when such is not
truly the case. Moreover, individuals who are known mixtures of
more than one of these societally ascribed groups also tend to be
socialized according to the physical appearance of oneself or one's
presumed ancestors. Thus, racial assignment is evident in statements
such as he or she "looks" Hispanic or ___ (fill in the blank).
As previously discussed, it is the case that socioracial groups (and
consequently members of those groups) occupy different positions
along the national sociopolitical power hierarchy such that in the U.S.,
Whites are assumed to define the superior group, whereas Blacks are
assumed to be their opposites or the inferior group, with all other
groups of color falling somewhere between the two extremes (d.
Hacker, 1992; Spikard, 1992). Moreover, differential treatment or
racial discrimination is such that Whites on average occupy the top
rungs of the societal sociopolitical and economic hierarchies, whereas
Blacks on average occupy the bottom rungs. The other socioracial
groups typically occupy intermediate rungs, although the order of
their occupation may vary depending upon which dimension is being
considered.
Thus, for racial identity theoretical and measurement purposes, it
is assumed that lower status socioracial groups generally contrast
themselves against Whites, whereas Whites generally contrast themselves against Blacks. Considerable empirical evidence exists to the
effect that Whites generally consider Blacks to be their "opposites,"
although the term "blacks" historically was more inclusive of all
groups of color than the term "Blacks" is today. Such evidence
includes several decades of social distance and racial stereotype
studies (Feagin, 1984; Gardner, Lalonde, Nero, & Young, 1988). Also,
Gardner et a1. (1988) reported that even when objective surveys of
racial attitudes indicate a diminishment in such biases, more subtle
forms of measurement (e.g., behavioral measures) reveal that they are
still prevalent.
Unfortunately, People of Color are rarely asked about their feelings and attitudes about either other groups of color or Whites in
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empirical studies. Consequently, the supposition that conflictual
relations with Whites define the primary racial identity themes of
People of Color is based on previously cited theoretical formulations
in which Whites were identified as the relevant contrast group. Most
of these perspectives propose similar thematic concerns, although
their concepts may be differently labeled (e.g., Atkinson, Morten, &
Sue, 1989; Myers, Speight, Highlen, Cox, Reynolds, Adams, & Hanley,
1991).
Thus, Helms's Black (and People of Color) and White models
differ in content so as to be consistent with relevant societal themes or,
in Erikson's (1975) words, "the historical moment". However, all of
Helms's racial identity models (e.g.,1989, 1990a, 1992, 1995; Helms &
Piper, 1994) are based on the following underlying common racialidentity themes: (a) one's racial identity develops in comparison to
one's "contrast" racial group; (b) healthy identity development involves the abandonment of societal impositions of racial-self in favor
of one's own personally relevant self-definition; (c) members of all of
the socioracial groups develop racial identity by means of a sequential
process in which increasingly more sophisticated differentiations of
the ego evolve from earlier or less mature statuses; and (d) qualitative
differences in expression of racial identity statuses can be measured,
but development must be inferred from responses to measures.
Helms uses the term ego status to refer to the cognitive-affective
information-processing strategies (IPS) by which people encode, analyze, react to, and retrieve racial information. Therefore, statuses in
her framework are hypothetical constructs. She uses "schema" to
refer to the observable (and therefore, measurable) manifestations of
statuses. Thus, existing measures of racial identity can potentially
assess schema, but not statuses (or stages) . As shown in Tables 2 and
3, different strategies may underlie each of the schema. Thus, two
individuals governed by the same status may actually express themselves via different information processing strategies.
The extent to which statuses evolve and consequently, schema
can be expressed depends, in part, on the versions of racial identity
expression modeled in the environment as well as the manner in
which race-related rewards and punishments are dispensed in a
person's significant (that is, rewarding or punishing) environments.
Therefore, an adequate measure of racial identity has to incorporate
such dynamics as they presently occur in the dominant or
superordinate societal environments in which respondents to such
measures can be reasonably expected to have been socialized. The
descriptions of the schema constitute thematic content that is presum-
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Table 2. Black Racial Identity Ego Statuses, Information-Processing Strategy

(IPS), and Sample Schema Items
General Pri nciples

Black Statuses

Status I-acceptance of societa lly
imposed racial characteri zations and
rules for dispensing societal resources.

Conformity (Preencounter)- External
self-definition which implies devaluation of one's own group, and idealization of Whites and White sta ndards of
merit.

IPS: denial, distancing, own-group
blaming, individualism

Sample: "I feel uncomfortab le arou nd
Black people."

Status 2-Confusion concerning one's
racial group commitment and ambivalent racial self-definition.

Dissonance (Encounter)- Ambivalence
and confusion concerning one's role
relative to one's own racial group and
the White group.

IPS: disorientation, repression,
vacillation

Sample- "l feel guilty or anx ious about
some of the things I believe about Black
people."

Status 3- ideali zation of one's group
and use of external standards to define
oneself, and the contrast group, resi sting outgroup oppressive forces.

Immersion!Emersion- idealization of
one's own racial group, denigration of
that which is perceived to be White,
emphasis on group empowerment.

IPS: hypervig ilance, judging, dichotomizing, combative

Sample: "I frequently confront the
system and the (White) man."

Status 4-resolving of intrapsychi c
conflict with contrast racial group and
internali zing of positive racial characteristics.

Internalization-intellectualizing, capacity to objectively assess and respond
to members of the White group, and use
of interna l criteria for self-definition .

IPS: analytic, flexible, intellectualizing

Sample: "People regardless of their race
have strengths and limitations."

Status 5- questioning, analysis, and
comparison of racial group status
re lative to other socioracial groups,
universal resistance to oppression .

Integrative Awareness (Internalization!
Commitment)- Capacity to va lue one's
own collective identities as well as recogni ze similarities between oneself and
other oppressed people.

IPS: probing, restructuring,
integrating

Sample: "I involve myself in social action and political groups even if there
are no other Blacks invo lved."

The Black racial identit y statuses are li sted in ascend ing order of evolution and
complexity of express ion, and are adapted from Helms (in press) and Helms and Piper ( 1994).

Note:
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Table 3 . White Racial Identity Ego Statuses, Information-ProcesSing Stra tegy

(IPS), and Sample Schema Items.
General Principles

White Statuses

Status I- acceptance of societally imposed racial characterizations and rul es
for di spensing societal resources.

Contact- satisfaction with rac ial status
quo, obliviousness to racism and one's
participation in it.

IPS: denial , obliviousness, naivete

Sample: "I wish I had a Black friend ."

Status 2- Confusion concerning one's
racial group commitment and ambivalent racial self-definition.

Disintegration- Di sorientation caused
by racial moral dilem mas which force
one to choose between commitment to
one's racial group and principles of
humanity .

IPS: di sori entation, suppression

Sample: "I do not feel that I have the
social ski lls to interact with B lack people
effectively."

Status 3- ideali zation of one's group
and use of ex ternal standards to defin e oneself, and other gro ups.

Reintegration- ideali zation of one's own
racial group, deni gration o f other racial
groups, championship of own-group
entitle ment.

IPS: minimi zation, selective perception, outgroup distortion

Sample: "I get angry when I think about
how Whites have been treated by
Blacks."

Status 4- "good-bad" dichotomi zations of racial groups and imposition
of owngroup's standards as cond ition
for acceptance.

Pseudo-Independence- ration alized
commitment to own racial group and of
ostensible liberalism toward other groups.

IPS: rationali zation, selective perception

Sample: "I feel as co mfortable around
Blacks as I do around Whites. "

Status 5- questioning, analysis, and
co mparison of rac ial group status relative to other groups.

Immersion/Emersion- search for an
understanding of how one benefits from
and co ntributes to racism.

IPS: hypervi gilance, probing, analyzing

Sample: "I am making a special effort to
understand the significance of being
White."

Status 6- self-affirmin g comm itment to
one's societally assigned racial group;
flex ible standards for perceiving other
racial group members.

Autonomy- informed, integrated positi ve racial-group co mmitment, use of
internal standards for self-definition,
capacity to relinqui sh the privileges of
racism.
(co ntinued ... )
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Table 3 (continued)
General Principles

White Statuses

IPS: integrating, intellectualizing

Sample: "I involve myself in ca uses
regard less of the race of the people
involved in them."

Note: The White rac ial ident ity statuses are li sted in ascend ing order of evo lution and
complex ity of express ion, and are adapted from Helms (in press) and Helms and Piper (1994).

ably relevant in contemporary society, but may change as the racial
zeitgeist changes.
From Helms's perspective, the racial identity developmental process (that is, evolution of statuses) and expression of one's racial
identity (that is, racial identity schema) are not necessarily synonomous.
The process defines the sequence by which various racial identity ego
statuses may become available for influencing behavior as broadly
defined; expression concerns the race-related quality of the observed
behavior. One can infer the presence of particular statuses from behavior
samples (e.g., responses to scale items). Presumably, one cannot use a
particular schema unless the underlying stahlS has evolved to some
extent. However, one cannot conclude that any single sample of racerelated behavior necessarily reveals all of the statuses that are potentially
accessible to the person. Because a status has differentiated to some
extent in the person's ego (i.e., is present) does not mean it will necessarily govern the person's behavior. Therefore, measures of each schema
ought to include more than one sample of the behavior intended to
reflect a particular form of identity expression so that consistency of the
person's response can be determined.
Moreover, the rate at which statuses differentiate within individuals is proposedly determined by each person's own level of
cognitive-affective maturity in combination with the amount and
quality of his or her race-related socialization (Helms, 1984). For
measurement purposes, these idiographic aspects of racial identity
may be problematic to the extent that one relies on group-level
measurement principles for developing one's measures without adjusting them for person-level characteristics. Be that as it may, in
general, the statuses (i.e., cognitive-affective information-processing
strategies) are assumed to evolve in approximately the following
sequence: (a) adaptation of societal interpetations of one's racial
group(s) relative to others; (b) confusion and disorientation; (c) idealized identifying with one's own group; (d) capacity to question
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societal racial ascriptions with respect to one's own self relative to
societal socioracial groups, and (e) internalizing of a personally affirming racial identity.
Depending on which socioracial group the person being assessed
seemingly belongs to, and where the group lies in the sociopolitical
power hierarchy with respect to these issues, the names given to the
various statuses of the developmental process and the details of their
thematic content may differ.
In Tables 2 and 3, respectively, the Black and White models of
racial identity are briefly summarized for the purpose of illustrating
measurement conundrums. More detailed explications can be found
in Helms (in press, 1992, 1994b, 1995). In Column 1, the contents or
basic themes of the expressed statuses (i.e., schema) and the cognitive. affective information processing strategies (IPS) of the statuses are
described. Column 2 provides an example of relevant items from the
respective identity measures.
Nevertheless, conceptually, the racial identity development process
is similar. That is, regardless of the person's racial classification, the
capacity to respond to racial stimuli in one's environment involves
multiple intrapsychic processes that differ in the complexity of reactions
to racial environmental catalysts they can generate. The process within
the United States is "universal" because racial classification is omnipresent in this country, but aspects of the content of the process may be
unique to groups as well as to individuals within the groups. Moreover,
content may change as society changes its manner of socializing racial
groups, but the process of developing racial identity should persist as
long as socioracial groups are differentially valued by the society.
Black and (People of Color) Identity. In actuality, the process of racial
identity development for Blacks is not incongruent with that of other
disenfranchised groups of color in many respects. In fact, Atkinson et
al. (1989) developed a general conceptual model of oppression to
reflect their belief that" oppressed-group" identity, that is, for groups
socialized under similar conditions of racial discrimination and oppression, healthy identity development requires that they resolve
similar identity conflicts within themselves.
Thus, many of the theoretical issues raised with respect to Black
Americans' racial identity development and expression also pertain
to other groups of color. Furthermore, concerns related to the measurement of their racial identity should pertain to various VREGs to
the extent that the other groups have been socialized under similar .
conditions of cross-generational racial oppression, and the measure
purports to assess intrapsychic reactions to such oppression.

160

HELMS

Consequently, if one is a member of the less empowered groups,
then one's primary racial (social) identity issue is to overcome the
internalized negative stereotyping associated with membership in
such groups in order to avoid permanent psychic wounding and to
form curative bonds with one's own group members. Because Blacks
are a numerical and sociopolitical minority in American society, it is
virtually impossible for them to exist without encountering society's
pro-White/ anti-Black socialization in some form. Therefore, it seems
conceivable that more Blacks than not will have developed complex
racial information-processing strategies at early ages because their
psychological and social survival requires such adaptation.
Table 2 summarizes the basic characteristics of the ego statuses
hypothesized to typify the racial identity developmental process for
Black Americans. It should be noted that Helms (Helms, 1984; Helms
& Parham, cited in Parham & Helms, 1981) originally used Cross's
labels for the racial identity stages (now called statuses) and related
subscales. However, to conform to her subsequent revisions of her
conceptual models (Helms, 1995; Helms & Cook, in press), she relabeled the subscales by using a combination of Atkinson et al.'s (1989)
and Cross's (1971) labels. The amalgamated labels are intended to
reflect more accurately the dynamic developmental processes underlying the subscale measures. Thus, in Table 2, labels in parentheses
are Cross's original names of the statuses where applicable.
White Racial Identity. If one is a member of the dominative group,
one's primary racial identity issues are to (a) overcome the entitled
stereotyping associated with membership in the White group, and (b)
learn to appreciate one's group and oneself as a member of the White
socioracial group without colluding with other group members in commandeering societal resources. Moreover, because a White person experiences majority status because he or she is a member of the White group,
then the person does not have to cope with resolving issues of racial
identity development unless he or she finds himself or herself in a
personally relevant situation(s) that challenges his or her entitled status,
and from which he or she cannot conveniently escape (Helms, 1984). In
other words, if it is true that the majority of Whites do not have to
contemplate their racial identity very much, then it is likely that any
randomly chosen group is likely to interpret racial stimuli (e.g., racerelated measure items) simplistically. Moreover, even individuals who
might be predisposed to process and respond to information by means
of cognitively and affectively complex statuses, might not be able to do
so if White role models who can exhibit complex racial responses are not
present in their socialization environments.
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Implications. Perhaps it is evident from the summaries in Table 2
and 3 that major measurement dilemmas with respect to Black and
White racial identity occur because each status may be expressed by
means of one of several dynamic nonlinear processes. Each of the
processes occurs in response to the three core components of racial
identity: individual, intragroup, and intergroup. These core dimensions are defined as follows: (a) intrapsychic or personal cognitiveaffective maturation processes, the extent to which a person is capable
of processing racial information; (b) the manner of internalizing one's
own-(racial) group affiliation (i.e., inward representations of societal
messages about one's ascribed racial group as communicated by
significant members of that group); and (c) the internalizing of outgroup relations, intrapychic evaluations of the contrast group (e.g.,
Whites for Blacks) relative to one's own socioracial group.
Each of the dimensions may covary in opposite directions. Thus,
for example, when a person's reactions are being directed by the
Conformity (Preencounter) status, he or she may function by conceptualizing himself or herself as an individual rather than as a member
of a group. Also, such a person presumably uses internalized negative stereotyping pertaining to his or her racial group to encode,
interpret, and react to racial stimuli pertaining to her or his own
group; but uses unrealistically positive internalized stereotyping to
process racial information pertaining to Whites.
Therefore, a measure of a particular schema (i.e., manner of
expressing statuses) should incorporate all three dimensions, individual characteristics, owngroup affiliation, and outgroup relations.
This assertion does not mean that every item or behavior sample
within a relevant measure should include all three dimensions, but
rather that the collection of items or behavior samples should be at
least tri-dimensional. Relatedly, the owngroup-outgroup or racial
elements of each status may be inversely related (i.e., function in
opposite directions), positively related (i.e., function in the same
directions), or not be related at all. For example, the Dissonance
(Encounter) and Disintegration statuses describe a person who is
being pulled in contradictory directions, toward his or her own group
as well as toward the out group. Consequently, an adequate measure
of racial identity ought to include the tension of racial-group dynamics as a defining dimension.
A measurement implication of the observations concerning the
potential tenuousness of White identity development and the virtually mandatory nature of Black identity development pertains to the
possibility that White and Black identity when examined on a group

162

HELMS

level, may be skewed in opposite directions for the two groups. The
more-or-less voluntary nature of White identity development means
that the population of White people should express racial identity
skewed in the direction of less mature identity statuses (positively
skewed). On the other hand, the more-or-less mandatory racial
identity development of Black people means the population with
respect to racial identity reactions should be skewed toward more
complex statuses (negatively skewed).
It has been argued (Brown & Gore, 1994; Nunnally, 1978) that a
measure is more capable of differentiating among individuals if the
distribution of scores w1derlying the measure is symmetrical (and
preferably normal). Therefore, depending upon the severity of the
skewness, it may be difficult to differentiate among individuals with
low scores when a measure's distribution of scores is positively
skewed, and among individuals with high scores when a measure's
distribution is negatively skewed. Moreover, it might be difficult to
develop racial identity measures or to investigate the psychometric
properties of existing measures without selecting one's sample to
compensate for potential skewnesses within the population under
investigation.
Ethnic Identity

The informal notion of an internalized ethnic identity as a phenomenon that is influenced by a person's connectedness and interactions with primary social groups has been around at least since Freud
(1 959) proposed his own irresistable "attraction" to "Jewry and Jews"
as an explanation for his intellectual accomplishments. Perhaps Freud
also provided the initial first-person description of the psychological
experience of possessing a collective identity. Here, collective identity
refers to a person's internalized ascribed (societally determined) or
achieved (earned) membership in social categories (e.g., racial classification, ethnic classification, gender).
Thus, Freud, who described himself as a life-long "unbeliever"
and a man "without any religion," is quoted as having described his
Jewish identity as follows: "[My Jewish identity consisted of] many
obscure emotional forces, which were the more powerful the less they
could be expressed in words, as well as a clear consciousness of inner
identity, the safe privacy of a common mental construction.... [And
b ]ecause I was a Jew I found myself free from many prejudices which
restricted others in the use of their intellect; and as a Jew I was
prepared to join the Opposition and to do without agreement with the
'compact majority'" (cited in Erikson, 1976, p . 62, italics added).
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Thus, from Freud's revelation, it becomes clear that as is the case
for racial identity, ethnic identity can also be a nebulous motivational
force that functions at the individual or person level. He also raised
the notion of ethnic identity as a "mental construCtion," which presumably distinguishes it from an objective reality. However, in this
paper, it is contended that the motivational force for ethnic identity.
which distinguishes it from racial identity, is cultural in nature, and
need not necessarily be "Oppositional." In fact, to be consistent,
theories and measures are discussed as ethnic in focus if they incorporate group-specific culture in more than a superficial (e.g., self or
theorist designation) manner, and racial if they only deal with the
dynamics of in-group /outgroup opposition and conflict.
This definitional strategy excludes those theoretical models that
purport to be etluuc identity models, but only deal with ethnicity in
comparison to other racial (rather than ethnic) groups; or-perhaps
more accurately-includes such models under the racial identity
rubric. However, it includes identity (sometimes called acculturation)
models that propose different styles of cultural adaptation based on
inevitable metacultural acculturative or assimilative pressures toward
conformity (e.g., Aboud, 1987; Aboud & Skerry, 1984). The definition
also includes models that attempt to describe ethnic-group cultural
affiliation or lack thereof (e.g., Bernal et al., 1990). Several measures
have been developed to assess etlmic cultural characteristics for
various ethnic groups. Therefore, it is probably useful to summarize
some of the basic tenets of the cultural adaptation and group-affiliation perspectives.
Cultural Adaptation. Several theorists have conceptualized ethnic
identity as cultural styles or patterns that groups evolve in response
to meta cultural pressures to relinguish traditional cultures (e.g., Aboud
& Skerry, 1984; Birman, 1994; Bulhan, 1980; Ruiz & Padilla, 1977;
Szapocznik, Scopetta, Kurtines, & Aranalde, 1978; Stone quist, 1937;
Tajfel, 1978). Many of them propose some combination of the following patterns: (a) moving away from or relinquishment of one's traditional (ethnic) culture, (b) moving towards or internalizing the
metaculture, (c) rejection of both the etluuc culture and the metaculture,
and (d) moving towards or internalizing both cultures (i.e.,
biculturality). Thus, these conceptualizations attempt to describe
differential levels of cOlmectedness with one's etlmic group as well as
the metaculture. The basic measurement task with respect to these
models is to differentiate among the proposed styles.
Ethnic Group Affiliation. According to Bernal et al. (1990), ethnic
identity consists of the following five components: (a) ethnic self-
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identification, defined as involving self-categorization and labeling of
oneself as a member of the ethnic group based on "appropriate
[ingroup] cues"; (b) ethnic constancy, awareness that "one's ethnic
characteristics are unchanging and permanent" (p. 5); (c) performance
of ethnic role behaviors, not necessarily knowledgeable use of a wide
range of ethnic behaviors, values, customs, and so forth; (d) ethnic
knowledge, awareness of the content (e.g., customs, behaviors, etc.) of
the relevant ethnic culture; and (e) ethnic preferences and feelings,
attraction toward one's ethnic group and the culture that defines the
group.
This perspective does not propose specific interrelationships
among the various components. Nor does it specify an ordering or
sequencing of components as does racial identity developmental
theory. However, Bernal et al. (1990) do speculate that children
become more adept at each of the components as they age, presumably because ethnic identification is based on conceptual cues that are
more subtle and, therefore, more difficult to recognize than is true of
racial identity. Consequently, for measurement purposes, it does not
appear that it is necessary for any single measure to evaluate all of the
proposed components, although for pragmatic purposes, presumably
each of them should be capable of being measured or assessed in
some manner.
MEASUREMENT OF ETHNIC AND RAC IAL IDENTITY

In the measurement literature, race and ethnicity generally are
used interchangeably. Thus, it is often difficult to determine which
construct researchers iJ1.tend to quantify. Nevertheless, in general, it
appears that both ethnic identity and racial identity have been measured most frequently by means of various kinds of paper-and-pencil
rating scales. However, several researchers have advised that measurement of racial or ethnic identity would be improved by focusing
upon the respondents' subjective experiences of race or culture, but
not both in a single measure (e.g., Alba, 1990; Landrine & Klonoff,
1994). Such a differential focus would make it easier to identify
measurement dilemmas that are peculiar to one form of collective
identity rather than the other.
Measures of Ethnic Identity

In the identity conceptual and measurement literature, sometimes
ethnic identity measures are called ethnic identity measures, and
sometimes they are called acculturation measures. For the purposes of
this paper, the mitigating factors that define a measure as an ethnic
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identity measure are that it (a) addresses some aspect of culture as
defined by adaptation to a group's culture or self-reported kinship
with a cultural group, (b) includes the person's subjective experience
of culture or acculturation in some manner, and (c) that one's specific
cultural rather than socioracial group be a central aspect of the
measurement process.
Three categories of ethnic identity measures were gleaned from
Atkinson and Thompson's (1992) review of racial and cultural variables in counseling. They are unidimensional, componential, and
bicultural. Unidimensional scales measure the person's acquisition of
the meta culture (e.g., Cuellar, Harris, & Jasso, 1980); componential
scales measure the extent to which a person expresses various components (e.g., language, kinship) of her or his traditional culture (e.g.,
Bernal et al., 1990; Padilla, 1980); and bicultural scales measure the
person's level of acclimation to the metaculture and her or his traditional culture (Szapocznik et al., 1978).
The theoretical model underlying most of these measures is either
cultural adaptation or a combination of kinship and cultural adaptation. An example of a unidimensional combination scale is Cuellar et
al.'s (1980) Acculturation Rating Scale for Mexican Americans
(ARSMA). Respondents use 20 multiple-choice items to describe
themselves with respect to (a) Spanish language facility, (b) owngroup
interaction, (c) ethnic self-designation, and (d) competence in Anglo
culture. Cutoff scores are used to assign respondents to one of three
to five categories (very Mexican, Mexican-oriented bicultural, true
bicultural, etc.). Several measures for other ethnic groups have been
adapted from the ARSMA (e. g., Suinn, Rickard-Figueroa, Lew, &
Vigil, 1987).
As PhiImey (1990) noted, often iIwestigators have not described
the psychometric characteristics of their measures or they have relied
on the measure originator's psychometric descriptions. Nevertheless,
Kunkel (1990) reported a Cronbach's alpha of .92 for the ARSMA, and
SuiIm et" al. (1987) reported an alpha coefficient of .88 for their Asian
adaptation, the SL-ASIA. Such results suggest that measures of etlmic
identity can be constructed in which items are highly interrelated and,
perhaps, are homogeneous.
Measures of Racial Identity

In their review of measures of racial identity, Burlew and Smith
(1991) classified such measures as follows: (a) developmental, focus
on intrapsychic and/or psychosocial adaptations to social and environmental forces of race and racism; (b) Africentric, examine manifes-
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tations of African-oriented personality characteristics; (c) group based,
emphasize level of affiliation or kinship with a racial group; and (d)
racial stereotyping, evaluate the extent to which societal racial stereotypes have been internalized. Most of the racial identity measures
have had Black people as their focus. The racial identity measures
developed by Helms and her associates (e.g., Helms & Parham, 1985;
Helms & Carter, 1990) are direct descendants of the developmental
approaches of measuring racial identity (e.g., Cross, 1971).
Description. Both the Black and White racial identity measures have
similar measurement dilemmas to be resolved because they are based on
analogous theoretical frameworks (see Tables 2 and 3). Consequently,
the subsequent observations about the psychometric properties of such
measures and recommendations for resolving some of the measurement
and assessment concerns generally pertain to both the Black (BRIAS) and
White (WRIAS) racial identity scales, although the WRIAS will generally
be used to illush'ate relevant points.
Both identity scales are rationally constructed personality measures intended to quantify the level of implementation (that is, expression) of the relevant racial identity ego statuses. Because the subscales
of the measures are intended to reflect the constructs of racial identity
theory, they are intended to be multidimensional in nature. That is,
each subscale in its entirety is intended to quantify the manner in
which the respondent reacts to racial information about self relative to
his or her own racial group as well as the relevant contrast group as
previously discussed. Respondents use 5-point Likert scales (l =Strongly
Disagree to 5=Strongly Agree) to respond to items similar to those
shown in Tables 2 and 3. Primacy or strengths of schema usage are
inferred from a person's racial identity subscale scores (i.e., higher
scores imply stronger or more dominant schema).
The racial identity measures have face validity as attitudinal measures and were originally conceived as such. However, some evidence
supports the conclusion that the items comprising the measure elicit
individual interpretations of racial stimuli rather than objectively reportable attitudes or opinions. The evidence includes (a) respondents'
unsolicited written interpretations of and perhaps reactions to WRIAS
items (Remy, 1993), (b) the lack of substantial relationships between
racial identity sub scale scores and measures of social desirability (e.g.,
Meijer, 1993), and (c) the fluidity of racial identity subscale scores under
conditions of racial stimulation (Corbett, 1994; Meijer, 1993).
Remy (1993) summarized her respondents' unsolicited written
responses to WRIAS items. She noted that most of her sample either
agreed or disagreed with the Contact item, "I wish I had a Black friend,"
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as intended. However, a small (unspecified) percentage of her sample
responded by reporting that they had a Black friend and chastising the
researcher for accusing them of racism. Hacker (1992) contends that such
testifying is typical for most White "liberals" because having a Black
friend is evidence to themselves and others that they are not racists.
Additionally, Remy found a variety of idiosyncratic responses to other
items including drawn swastikas, musings about how Blacks might
respond to the items, explanations of why the person answered as he or
she did, and so forth. Interestingly, individualistic interpretations of
items were even more evident on scales in which Remy replaced
"Blacks" with "Asian Americans" in item stems.
Some evidence suggests that racial identity expressions may not
be related to standard measures of social desirability on a group level
(Meijer, 1993). The correlations shown in the diagonal of Table 6
indicate negligible correlations between the racial identity subscales
and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Marlowe &
Crowne, 1961), a standard measure of a social desirability response
set. The sample on which the correlational analyses were conducted
are from Helms and Carter (1991). Meijer also found negligible
correlations ranging from -.16 (Disintegration and Reintegration) to
.11 (Autonomy) for her sample of 243.
It is at least conceivable that for subscales to have strong social
desirability response sets, items would need a recognizable positive
direction. However, racial identity theory postulates that the social
desirability of items is determined by the status the person uses in
processing them.
Meijer (1993) and Corbett (1994) investigated environmental and
intrapsychic conditions under which scores on WRIAS subscales
vary. Meier investigated changes in psychology students' WRIAS
subscale scores over a 12-week interval during which the experimental group was exposed to an introductory psychology course with a
multicultural emphasis. She found that none of the racial identity
expression subscale scores changed significantly except Pseudo-Independence, which decreased by the end of the interval regardless of
whether respondents had participated in the course. Thus, her
findings suggest that under normal circumstances, racial identity
expressions measured at a group level are quite stable over time.
Corbett (1994) found that those respondents who were exposed to
a role-reversal racial fantasy rather than a career fantasy expressed
lower levels of Contact and Pseudo-Independence and higher levels
of Disintegration, Reintegration, and Immersion/Emersion. Moreover, their racial identity expressions following the race fantasy were
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more predictive of dimensions of healthy and defensive narcissism
than they were prior to the fantasy in directions consistent with racial
identity and narcissism theories. Thus, Corbett's results support
Helms's contention that racial identity expressions can be stimulated
by external racial catalysts.
Consequently, when used at the group level, racial identity measures at best evaluate common reactions to the racial catalysts contained within items. However, in the absence of information about
the particular racial socialization experiences of the respondents, it is
not clear what subscale scores mean for or about a person's racial
identity expressions at the individual level.
MEASUREMENT ISSUES AT THE GROUP LEVEL

Several explorations of the psychometric properties of the racial
identity research scales have appeared in the counseling literature
(e.g., Helms & Carter, 1990; Ponterotto & Wise, 1989; Swanson, Tokar,
& Davis, 1994; Yanico, Swanson, & Tokar, 1994). Moreover, virtually
all of the studies of other personality constructs thought to be related
to racial identity schema also have included investigations of the
psychometric properties of the measures to some extent (e.g., Watts &
Carter, 1991; Ottavi et al., 1994), and investigators have deleted
subscales on the basis of the results of these local analyses. Although
investigators typically have not said so, "classical" measurement
theory apparently has been the conceptual measurement model on
which the psychometric explorations of racial identity measures have
been based.
In classical measurement theory (i.e., "strong true score" theory), a
basic measurement assumption is that every observed score (X) presumably arises from one of two sources, true score (T) or error (E). This
relationship is commonly symbolized by the formula X = T + E. Because
the value of T (the amount of the construct being measured) cannot be
measured or observed directly, it is inferred from relationships among Xs
(i.e., items, test scores, etc.). A number of other measurement assumptions follow from the basic h'ue-score premise. DeVellis (1991) summarizes some of the consequent assumptions as follows:
1. The amount of error associated with individual items varies
randomly. The error associated with individual items has a
mean of zero when aggregated across a large number of
people. Thus, items' means tend to be unaffected by error
when a large number of respondents complete the items.
2. One item's error term is not correlated with another item's
_ error term; the only routes linking items pass through the
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latent variable [i.e., the true score variance], never through
any error term.
3. Error terms are not correlated with the true score. (p. 17).
Thus, the assumptions imply that obtained interrelationships
(typically expressed as correlations) among items indicate the amount
of true score (e.g., racial identity) being measured rather than the
amount of error. The use of correlations to indicate the amount of true
score manifested in a set of items also assumes that items (or rather
the true variance present in such items) are linearly related. However,
there are several reasons why these basic tenets of classical measurement theory probably are not directly applicable to measurement of
racial identity schema. The groundwork for most of these arguments
appeared in prior sections, but it might be necessary to state the
reasons more explicitly. They are as follows: (a) Racial identity theory
is a description of how people process racial information at an
individual level. Although the classical-measurement assumptions
may be used effectively to obtain descriptive statistics for an entire
group, they cannot be used to determine T and E exactly for any
individual. (b) Individual differences in responding to the racial
identity items are the essence of the theory, but would be considered
error under the general assumptions previously cited (see Lyman,
1978). (c) Individual reactions (e.g., person-environment reactivity) to
racial identity items are not proposed to be linear and consequently,
relationships among items might be underestimated if one uses
w1adjusted linear methodologies to evaluate such relationships. These
sources of incongruence between racial identity theory and the cited
classical measurement assumptions also may bear on other aspects of
the psychometric properties of racial identity measures.
Most efforts to evaluate the psychometric properties of racial identity measures have been studies of the reliability and/ or internal structure of the measures. In these investigations, researchers have tended to
treat racial identity subscales as though they were intended to be linear
group-level measures, and have evaluated their psychometric properties
on the basis of strict conformance to the principles of classical measurement theory as previously summarized. Consequently, the interpretations of the results obtained from such studies have contributed to the
confusion regarding measurement of racial identity constructs.
Reliability

Conceptually, reliability historically has been defined as the correlation between parallel tests (DeVellis, 1991; Graham & Lilly, 1984;
Nunnally, 1978). In this case, "tests" can be interpreted to mean items
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within subscales that are intended to measure the same process (i.e.,
racial identity schema). Thus, when measures are developed with
classical measurement theory as their underlying measurement model,
reliability coefficients describe the degree of linear interrelationship(s)
among tests (or items).
In her critique of racial and ethnic identity measures, Phim1ey
(1 990) noted that reliability with respect to such measures typically is
not reported or "is low enough to raise questions about conclusions
based on the measure" (p. 506). Furthermore, she noted that Cronbach's
alphas were the reliability coefficients usually reported by the 20% of
studies she reviewed in which reliability was reported. For the
various measures, she indicated that reported reliabilities have ranged
from .35 to .90.
However, Helms's (e.g., Parham & Helms, 1981) Black racial
identity inventory w as the only measure specifically mentioned, and
for this measure, Phinney (1990) cited alphas ranging from .66 to .72.
Researchers subsequent to her review have reported alpha reliabilities
ranging from .45 to .63 for the BRIAS (Yanico et al., 1994). For the
WRIAS, the following ranges have been reported : .55 to .82 (Helms &
Carter, 1990); .43 to .85 (Regan, 1992), .18 to .75 (Ottavi et al., 1994),
and .61 to .84 (Tokar & Swanson, 1991; Swanson et al., 1994). In Table
4, Cronbach's (1951 ) coefficient alpha estimates of internal consistency
reliability are reported for the WRIAS subscales corresponding to the
schema described in Table 3. The range is from .54 to .79.
Table 4 . Summary of Psychometric Properties of the WRIAS.
Scale

/"xx

Mean

SD

Range

Contact

.54

3 1.03

4.70

13--44

Di sintegration

.76

24.38

5.45

10- 39

Rei ntegration

.79

24.33

5.99

11--46

Pseudo Independence

.62

35.38

4.72

13--47

Autonomy

.67

34.94

4.94

16--48

Total

.37

149.35

10.54

106- 182

No le. rXX = coefficient alpha estimates.
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Ordinarily, in constructing personality measures, internal consistency reliability is a primary issue. Nevertheless, the range of internal
consistencies of subscales of well-established general identity inventories is quite variable. For example, in their analysis of the psychometric properties of seven well-known identity measures, Walsh and
Betz (1985) reported internal consistency reliabilities in the .50s and
.60s for the stages of Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test (DIT), a
measure of moral development; and reliabilities ranging from .45 to
.78 for the Student Development Task Inventory-2 (SDTI-2; Winston,
Miller, & Prince, 1979), a measure of Chickering's developmental
vectors. Of the published identity measures the authors described, the
DIT and the SDTI-2 were the only two by which the quality of
respondents' psychosocial identity statuses is inferred from objectively scored scales rather than rater-scoring procedures.
Examination of the alpha coefficients shown in Table 4 reveals
that they are not great if one uses cognitive ability tests as the
standard, but that they are not bad in comparison to psychosocial
identity inventories. Typically, low racial identity alpha coefficients
have been interpreted to mean a lack of homogeneity among items or
the presence of heterogeneity (e.g., Yanico et al., 1994). Yet at least a
couple of other explanations are possible, particularly when one
considers the variability of reported alphas across studies and (presumably) research sites.
An obvious explanation is that researchers may not have sampled
adequately. In order to obtain high coefficient alphas, one needs to
have some people who have high scores relative to some people who
have low scores. If the distributions of racial identity statuses within
populations are skewed, then one may need to do special sampling to
include people who can express the under-represented statuses. Thus,
for example, one might need to find White people who are civil rights
activists to represent adequately the higher end of the Autonomy
subscale. Most researchers to date have used convenience and/or
regional samples, but have not selected samples who might reasonably be expected to be capable of expressing the schema under
investigation.
Furthermore, under the best of circumstances, Cronbach's (1951)
alpha coefficient estimates the degree of interrelationship among a set
of items rather than the degree of homogeneity of scales or subscales
(Green, Lissitz, & Mulaik, 1977). However, Green et al. note that
alpha coefficients may underestimate the interrelatedness of items
under the following conditions: (a) if items' true scores are related to
one another in nonlinear ways that cannot be revealed by a correlation
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matrix and/ or (b) items are negatively related to one another. Also, if
situational variables interact with the characteristics of the person
rather than being a form of random variance, then coefficient alpha
might also underestimate the reliability of measures.
Ordinarily, the recommended tedmiques for analyzing the reliability of multifactorial scales have been split-half, alternate forms, or immediate test-retest (Cureton, 1967; Dawis, 1987). However, most of these
approaches are not entirely workable for establishing the reliability of
racial identity measures for a variety of reasons. Alternate form reliability will not function as a reliability-estimating approach because none of
the racial identity measures has an alternate form. Immediate test-retest
reliability should reveal that subscale responses are stable over short
periods of time given Meijer's (1993) and Corbett's (1994) findings of
stability over extended periods of time. However, although test-retest
would reveal whether the processes were stable over short periods of
time, it is not apparent that such procedures would reveal much about
the structure of items within subscales, which presumably is the question
that motivates researchers who use coefficient alpha.
Of the recommended alternative reliability procedures, split-half
potentially can be adapted for assessing item structure by means of
linear analysis. However, one would need to use what DeVellis
(1991) calls "balanced" halves rather than the customary splitting
(e.g., random, odd-even) procedures. When using a balancing procedure, halves are chosen so that items indicative of relevant item
characteristics or principles are present in both halves. Thus, for
example, in the present case, one might select halves according to the
information-processing strategies being tapped by items, so that the
strategies are equivalently represented in both halves. To date,
balanced split-halves have not been used to evaluate the reliability of
the racial identity subscales.
Be that as it may, due to low alpha coefficients, editors have
forced researchers (e.g., Watts & Carter, 1991) to eliminate certain
scales from their research as a condition for publication (Carter,
personal communication). The editors contend that it is impossible to
know what a scale is measuring if its coefficient alpha is low. However, given the virtual dearth of racial identity measures with a
substantial history of psychometric exploration, reliance on coefficient alpha as the sole indicator of the interrelatedness of items is
probably premature when the possible limitations of this approach
for evaluating the reliability of racial identity measures is considered.
In addition, although sample size does generally affect the size of
reliability coefficients, smaller reliability coefficients can be used to
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describe accurately the responses of large groups relative to small
groups or individuals. Thus, for example, Thorndike and Hagen
(1969) can be used to illustrate this point. They compared changes
over two occasions in the rank ordering of two people's, small groups'
(N = 25), and large groups' (N = 100) scores, when the initial scores
placed one person or group at the 50th percentile and the other's score
placed the person or group at the 75th percentile. They calculated that
a reliability coefficient of .50 would result in inconsistent descriptions
(i.e., a reversal in rank order) about 36.8% of the time for two people,
whereas the same size coefficient would result in inconsistent descriptions of 100-person groups 1 in 2,500 (.04%) times.
It seems reasonable to infer from Thorndike and Hagen's discourse that if one uses the criteria of state-of-the-art and sample size,
then even the racial identity subscale with the lowest internal consistency reliability coefficient (Contact= .54) shown in Table 4 should be
suitable for describing the rank order of groups of 100 or more most
of the time and smaller samples almost two-thirds of the time. Thus,
for virtually all of the racial identity studies intended to examine the
reliability or validity of the racial identity measures (e.g., Tokar &
Swanson, 1991; Ottavi & Pope-Davis, 1994; Swanson et al., 1994), the
reported internal consistency reliabilities have been adequate for
describing groups according to Thorndike and Hagen's criteria, researchers' admonitions notwithstanding.
Thus, in the construct-validity literature pertaining to racial identity measures (e.g., Ottavi et al., 1994; Tokar & Swanson, 1991; Watts
& Carter, 1991), alpha coefficients were used primarily to describe the
subscale responses of samples of at least 100 persons. For example,
even Tokar and Swanson (1991; Swanson et al., 1994), who contend
that their studies demonstrate the inadequate psychometric properties of racial identity measures, used a sample consisting of 309
college students. The alpha coefficients that they obtained were
adequate for the group-level statistics that they performed (multiple
regressions) according to Thorndike and Hagen's criteria despite
Tokar and Swanson's protestations to the contrary.
Of course, one should attempt to construct highly reliable measures, but the procedures for determining reliability should be consistent with the conceptual model on which the measure is based.
Moreover, reliability should not repl~ce validity as the indicator of a
measure's psychometric merits (Ebel, 1961; Thorndike & Hagen,
1969). In those instances in which researchers obtain low alpha
reliability coefficients, they should perhaps use their findings as a
catalyst for considering alternative measurement models, or reconsid-
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ering the manner in which their data were collected. Moreover, low
subscale coefficient alphas combined with evidence of subscale validity (e.g., significant correlations between the subscales and measures
external to the identity measures) should serve as an additional
catalyst for considering the applicability of one's measurement model
and/ or sampling procedures.
Scale Correlations

Various researchers have also used subscale intercorrelations to
investigate the internal structure of racial identity measures (Ottavi et
al., 1994; Swanson et al., 1994; Yanico et al., 1994). In general,
subscales developmentally contiguous to one another should be correlated without being completely overlapping. Investigators of the
construct validity of the subscales who use multiple regression to
predict other personality variables from racial identity have been
particularly concerned when moderately to highly correlated scales
do not each predict the variables of interest as expected.
In this regard, Tokar and Swanson (1991) fow1d a correlation of .66
between the Pseudo Independence (alpha=.65) and Autonomy (alpha =
.71) subscales of the WRIAS. In regression analyses, they found that
when Pseudo Independence was used as one of five predictors, it did not
W1iquely predict any of their criterion measures, but Autonomy significantly predicted llmer-directedness or self-acceptance. From such findings, they concluded that "some of the [racial identity] subscale
intercorrelations were so high as to suggest redw1dancy" (p. 299).
Although conclusions concerning redundancy of the subscales
are at least debatable, it is also the case that ll1 the absence of
correlations of 1.00, correlations may not reveal much about how
individuals within the sample respond. In Table 7, the subscales with
the correlation between them closest to Tokar and Swanson's "redundant" correlation are Autonomy and Pseudo Independence (1' = .66).
Table 6 shows that most of the sample (93.5%) uses both of the two
schema in statistically equivalent levels, but that approximately 4%
uses Autonomy more and approximately 3% uses Pseudo Independence more. Of the two statuses, Autonomy is the more complex
cognitively and affectively. Thus, at best a high intersubscale correlation can suggest the extent to which a sample uses two schemata,
but it cannot reveal the ordering of the expressions within the sample.
Factor Analyses

In addition to Cronbach's alpha, exploratory factor analyses have
also been used to examine the internal structure of the racial identity
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measures at an item level (Ponterotto & Wise, 1989; Swanson et al.,
1994; Yanico et al., 1994). However, three reasons why standard
factor analysis may not be the best analytic strategy for investigating
Helms and her associates' (Helms & Parham, 1985; Helms & Carter,
1990) subscale items are as follows: (a) Neither racial identity subscales
nor racial identity measures in their entirety are intended to be
homogeneous or unidimensional; (b) the assumption of linear relationships between variables in factor analysis frequently results in a
large number of dimensions (Schiffman, Reynolds, & Young, 1981);
. and (c) standard factor analysis cannot reveal the ordering (that is, the
increasing complexity) of subscales or items within subscales.
In addition, most of the aforementioned problems have been
exaggerated because contemporary researchers have performed their
analyses on the entire scales rather than the individual subscales.
With respect to linear relationships, researchers (e.g., Ponterotto &
Wise, 1987) have reported that items reflective of transitional processes (e.g., Dissonance/Encounter) load on the same factors as the
items of one or the other adjacent subscales. The general aim of such
items is to pull the person in opposing directions. However, in factor
analysis, items tend to be "attracted" to the subscale items with which
they share the strongest linear relationships, even if those relationships are not very strong. However, such findings do not necessarily
mean that nonlinear dimensions could not account for more variance,
particularly if the items were analyzed within the context of their
separate subscale.
Prochaska, DiClemente, and Norcross (1992) encountered the
same problem with respect to continuous items intended to measure
a transitional or preparatory stage of mastering addictive disorders.
That is, the transitional items disappeared as a separate subscale
when principal components analyses were used to examine the construct validity of their measure. They noted that abandonment of
their preparatory stage in compliance with the factor analyses led
them to disregard an important aspect of their population's behavior.
Consequently they recommended that cluster analyses be used to find
the transitional stage because such analytic procedures did consistently reveal individuals who could be classified as transitional.
Cluster analytic approaches might be more appropriate than standard
factor analysis for racial identity measures as well.
Also, the concept of ordering as it is used in racial identity theory
may be inadequately assessed by standard factor analysis. Some of
the various racial identity information-processing strategies are superficially similar in content, but not in function. For example, the
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denial of Contact is similar to the rationalization of Pseudo Independence. Consequently, it would not be surprising to find denial and
rationalization items loading on the same factors. Yet clinicians
generally consider rationalization to be a more complex mode of
reacting than denial. Standard factor analysis cannot reveal this type
of differential complexity.
Implications. Much of the existing literature supports the need for
alternative strategies for examining the psychometric properties of
racial identity scales that purport to be measures involving human
judgment or perceptual processes (i.e., process measures). One set of
approaches that has not received much attention in the relevant
literature, but might be useful in managing the problems of nonlinearity
and ordering of items within subscales is multidimensional scaling
(e.g., Schiffman et al., 1981). Basically, multidimensional scaling is a
statistical approach that allows one to discover the configurations
among items as subjects perceive them.
Helms (1990) tried group-level multidimensional scaling to study
the psychometric properties of the first 30 items of the BRIAS. She
abandoned such efforts for pragmatic reasons (i.e., it was not clear
that such approaches could be easily used by practitioners to assess
individuals). Nevertheless, she found that four theoretically consistent dimensions accounted for 89% of the variance among items,
whereas with four factors, Yanico et al. (1994) could only account for
about 20% of the variance among the same items using factor analysis.
Thus, this technique seems worthy of further investigation. Moreover, computer programs are now more widely available for performing multidimensional scaling on a person level than they were when
Helms first tried the technique for studying racial identity rating-scale
measures.
Assessment Issues

Neither the racial identity nor the ethnic identity measurement
perspectives has focused much on the issue of assessing relevant
constructs for practical as opposed to research (e.g., construct validity) purposes. In the absence of measures of the more psychologically
complex aspects of race and culture alluded to earlier, practitioners as
well as researchers have had to rely on simplistic indicators of
intrapsychic and interpersonal racial and/ or cultural dynamics. Thus,
the most commonly used "predictor" or "measure" of racial or ethnic
identity has been racial or ethnic categories as determined by surnames, self-designation, researcher categorization, and other similarly ambiguous criteria.

4. IDENTITY MEASUREMENT

177

In general, researchers and practitioners have noted the sterility
of such categorical information for describing racially or culturally
related behaviors. Even when researchers (e.g., Hauser, 1972; Phitmey,
1990) have used racial or ethnic group categories to compare groups'
responses on general identity measures derived from Erikson's
psychosocial model, the results have been less than illuminating.
Categorical ascriptions per se do not reveal much about a person's
intrapsychic processes, CaImot discriminate among individuals within
groups, and consequently, do not constitute assessment even in the
narrow sense that Aftanas (1994) defines the term.
Social cognitive theorists (e.g., Gardner et aI., 1988) often use the
term "individual differences" to refer to assessment or measurement
that occurs on an individual or person level as opposed to a "consensual" or group level. Constructs measured consensually require
groups of people to respond in the same directions, whereas individualistic measurement requires description of separate persons. Most of
the available racial identity measures have been investigated and
interpreted by means of consensual models, which mayor may not
yield the same kinds of information as would individual-difference
models. Nevertheless, it is possible to adapt some principles from
consensual models to make racial identity measures more amenable
to individual-difference interpretations.
Researchers and practitioners intending to use racial identity measures for diagnostic purposes are generally interested in discovering the
extent to which individuals can be differentially described by racial
identity schema. For racial identity measures to be useful, especially to
practitioners, for understanding and/ or communicating with their clientele about racial dynamics, practitioners need to be able to determine
which schemas are dominant or recessive for each client.
Profile Error Bands

Helms (1989) recommended that when researchers are using
racial identity scores whose psychometric properties have been determined by means of consensual measurement models, racial identity
profiles rather than single scores should be used to describe the
individual. According to previously discussed theoretical formulations, racial identity statuses (and consequently, schemas) are interrelated. Consequently, reliance on single scores risks discarding
important information. Nevertheless, subscales differ in internal consistency and response variability on a consensual level (see Table 4).
Therefore, subscale scores of the same numerical value might not be
of the same importance in the person's overall profile.
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A common adaptation of a consensual approach that is used in
personality measurement to evaluate the differential significance of
intra-individual subscale scores involves use of the standard error of
the difference between two scores (SEdif) . The SEdif allows one to
consider variations in measurement error (i.e., reliability) between
pairs of scores when interpreting intra-individual subscale score
differences. It can also be used to determine whether a person's
subscale scores, which appear to be different, are significantly different. By using the SEdif, profile error bands or ranges can be developed
to visually represent significantly different racial identity subscale
scores for people on an individual level.
The ranges shown in Table 5 were calculated at the .05 level of
significance using the following formula from Anastasi (1982, p. 129):

In this usage, SD is the average standard deviation of the two
subscales being compared and rxx and r are the respective subscale
YY
reliabilities.
Thus, Table 5 shows the minimum number of points by which
each pair of scales must differ at the .05 level of significance. The
numbers in the diagonals are the number of points by which a
subscale score would have to differ from itself, as for example, in a
Time l -:fime 2 testing paradigm. In case one does not have Table 5
at hand, if one uses a point spread of 9 points, then one should obtain
Table 5. Point Values For Determining Whether Subscale Scores Differ
Significantly
Scale

C

D

R

P

Contact (C)

8.84

Disintegration (D)

8.33

7.4 1

Reintegration (R)

8.57

7.52

7.60

Pseudo Independence (P)

8.46

7.85

7.10

8.06

Autonomy (A)

8.40

7.69

7.87

7.97

NOle.

A

7.86

Numbers in diagona l are the minimum amount of points by which scores mllst differ

from themselves to be significant at the .05 alpha leve l.
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a somewhat conservative estimate of whether a person's subscale
scores differ from one another at the .05 level of significance.
The reader might wish to use the SEdif point-values shown in
Table 5 to estimate the differential strength of individuals' responses,
particularly if he or she does not have access to large samples.
However, if one does have large samples (e.g., at least 100), then one
might wish to calculate local values for comparative purposes.
Figure 1 uses a circular diagram to represent the schema profile
bands for a person ("Sam"). The circle is used to emphasize the point
Figure 1. Sam's configuration of scores, C = P = =, is not an lmcommon
pattern (see Table 8). Moreover, in single-scale comparisons (see Table 6),
approximately 36% of respondents had high Contact scores and approximately 34% had high Pseudo-Independence scores.

Pseudo Independence 24.0%

Disintegration 15.0%

~ii~~m~~AutonOmY

22.0%

Contact 23.0%
Raw
Score

Strength

%
ile

Co mment

36

High

85

Co ntact is hi gher than Disintegration

Disintegration 23

Equal

40

Disintegration is lower than Contact
and eq uals Reintegration

Re integration 25

Low

60

Reintegration equals Disintegration and
is lower than Pseudo Indepe ndence

Pseudo
Independence 38

Eq ual

80

Pseudo Independe nce is hi gher than
Reintegration and equals Autonomy

Autonomy

35

Equal

35

Autonomy equals Pseudo Independence
and Contact

Total

157

Scale
Con tact
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that although racial identity statuses may be hierarchical in the sense
of reflecting ascendingly complex information-processing strategies,
they are not hierarchical in the sense that the use of one necessarily
precludes use of another. That is, schemas are not mutually exclusive.
Proceeding clockwise around the circumference of the circle, beginning with Contact minus Disintegration, successive pairs of subscales
were compared to obtain the frequencies shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Differential Frequencies of Strength of Endorsement of Pairs of
Contiguou s Subscales
Subscale

Strength of Endorsement

Comparison

Very

Direction

High
f

%

High

f

Equal

%

C>D

38

8.6

16 1

36.3

D >C

4

.9

8

1.8

.2

15

3.4

D> R
R >D

3

.7

16

3.6

R>P

6

1.4

9

2.0

P> R

147

33.2

149

33 .6

P> A

12

2.7

A>P

17

3.8

77

17.4

5

1.1

A>C
C>A

6

1.4

f

%

232

52.4

408

92.1

132

29.8

4 14

93.5

355

80.1

Note. Very high scores differ by two or more standard errors; high scores differ
by as much as one standard error; equal scores are within one standard error of
each other. Scale abbreviations are C=Contact, D=Disintegration, R=Reintegration,
P=Pseudo Independence, A=Autonomy.
N=443 .
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For this sample of 443 respondents, Table 6 shows the frequency distributions of respondents whose hypothesized developmentally adjacent (e.g., Contact versus Disintegration) subscale scores
differed by one ("High"), two ("Very High"), or zero ("Equal")
standard-error-difference scores. So, for example, each individual's
Disintegration score was subtracted from his or her Contact scores to
determine which exceeded the point spread shown in Table 5. Thus,
if a person's Contact score is between 8.33 and 16.66 points higher
than his or her Disintegration score, then the Contact score is "High";
a Contact score at least 16.66 higher is considered "Very High" (see
Figure 1). Obviously, in this example, positive scores suggest stronger Contact reactions whereas negative scores suggest stronger Disintegration reactions.
Table 6 shows that for about half of the respondents (52.4%),
Contact and Disintegration were expressed equivalently strongly (Le.,
within one standard error); for about 44.9%, Contact was expressed
one standard error ("High") or at least two standard errors (i.e., "Very
High") more strongly than Disintegration, whereas Disintegration
was expressed more or much more strongly than Contact for only
2.7% of the respondents.
A general theme evident in Table 6 for this sample is that for four
of the five comparisons (Contact vs. Disintegration, Disintegration vs.
Reintegration, Autonomy vs. Pseudo Independence, and Autonomy
vs. Contact), more than half of the respondents' subscale scores were
equivalent (range = 52.4% to 93.5%). In the remaining comparison
(Pseudo Independence vs. Reintegration), Pseudo Independence was
much higher (33.2%) or higher (33.6%) than Reintegration for almost
as many respondents as it was equivalent (29.8%). An implication of
these observations for interpreting respondents' scores is that reliance
on untransformed raw score comparisons may contribute to misleading conclusions.
It is possible to obtain an individual profile by analyzing the
person's five transformed (paired comparisons) scores for clusters,
profiles, or patterns. Loglinear analysis was used to obtain the
profiles summarized in Table 8. Of course, other clustering techniques could be used to accomplish similar effects. However, in this
case, because the high versus very high categories are nominal,
loglinear analysis was used to determine the number of combinations
of the five (positive very high to negative very high) possible transformations per (pair of) subscale comparisons.
Although 61 (of a possible 55) patterns or combinations of the five
transformed-comparison scores occurred, of these, only 13 were de-
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Table 7. Racial Identity Sub scale Correlations
Scale
Contact (C)

C

o

R

P

A

-0 I

- 19

-39

53

39

-08

69

-47

-59

-03

-45

-5 1

-02

66

Disintegration (D)
Reintegration (R)
Pseudo Independence (P)
Autonomy (A)

-00

Note. Decima ls omitted to conserve space. Correlation s above the diagonal are intercorre lations
among raw subscales. Diagona ls are correlation s betwee n rac ial identity subscales and
Marlowe-Crowne socia l desirabi lity scores (M =5.48. SD =7.21). All va lues above the diagonal
are significant beyond the .0 I alpha level.

scriptive of as many as 10 respondents. Most respondents had
comparatively high scores on at least one subscale. However, the
most frequently occurring configuration (19.6%) was undifferentiated
responding, meaning that none of the scales differed significantly
from its neighbors.
In Table 8, the first letter of a subscale is used to indicate that it
was the higher of the adjacent-scale comparisons; letters with asterisks equal very high statuses, and equal signs indicate scores were
within one standard error of one another. The most frequently
occurring configurations with at least 10 respondents are shown in
Table 8.
Not shown in Table 8 are 28 singletons (response patterns characteristic of one person) and 11 doublets (response patterns characteristic of
two persons). Naturally, scale score differences that occur infrequently
in Table 6 also occur infrequently in combinations in Table 8. For
example, Autonomy is only very much (two standard errors) higher than
Contact for six persons (see Table 6), and four of these people were
singletons when their configurations were examined.
Interpreting Response Patterns

Qualitative interpretation of personality profiles is an enduring
tradition in personality psychology. Following in this tradition,
qualitative interpretations of profiles presumably can be used to assist
clients in exploring their own issues of racial adjustment. Thus, some
suggestions as to how to use the racial identity schema profile shown
in Figure 1 might be useful. The circle is a heuristic device in that it
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Table 8. Summary of Frequency of Occurrence of White Identity Profile
Error Transformations

Comparison
C vs D D vs R
C*
C
C
C

R vs P
P*
P*
P*
P
P*
P
P

P vs A

A vs C

A

A
A

f

%

23
19
56
60
17
19
52
10
87

5.2
4.3
12.6
13.5
3.8
4.3
11.7
2.2
19.6

Note. Racial identit y subsca le abbreviations are C=Contact, D= Disintegration , R=Reintegration,
P=Pseudo Independe nce, A=Autonomy; hi gher subscale scores are indicated by the First letter
of subsca le names. Symbols are = (w ithin one standard error) , * (at least two standard errors
difference). Only profi les with frequencies of at least 10 (N = 443) are reported.

symbolizes that portion of the ego that the person hypothetically
allots herself or himself for the processing of racial stimuli. Thus, in
the case of inventory measures of racial identity (e.g., the WRIAS), the
total scores might be assumed to symbolize the total space available
to the person for responding to racial stimuli. The wedges in the circle
are merely the percentages of the total scale score of each subscale.
Standard error scores determine whether or not ostensibly different
percentages of endorsement represent significantly different schema
usage, and wedges that do not differ significantly have the same
shading in the figure. Theoretically, total scores (e.g., ego space) could
range from 50 to 250 points (i.e., from strong disagreement with all
items to strong agreement) . In both the case of strong disagreement
with all items and strong agreement with all items, such profiles
should be discarded for research or assessment purposes because they
indicate that the items did not elicit discriminative responses from the
respondent. Table 3 shows that for this sample, raw scores actually
ranged from 106 to 182. In Figure I, Sam's total score (the sum of his
subscale scores) of 157 is shown on the bottom row. Sam's total score
suggests that his profile is probably interpretable.
Ideally, each person should endorse some items strongly and
others not so strongly. However, a person with an overall score of 157
could exhibit the same patterns of subscale responses as someone
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with a higher overall score. Presumably, it is primarily the subscale
patterns rather than single raw subscale scores per se that reflect racerelated behavior because the patterns suggest which schemas are
dominant or recessive for the person.
Sam's overall profile can be described as C = P = = (that is, Contact
and Pseudo Independence were higher by one standard error than
their contiguous neighbor to the right). Approximately 14% of the
overall sample exhibited this pattern of responding (see Table 6). In
Figure I, Sam's profile does not reveal any strong highs or lows. In
fact, visually his racial identity expressions (schemas) are b~st described by two clusters, one described by Disintegration and Reintegration schemas, and the other described by the other three subscales
(Contact, Pseudo Independence, and Autonomy). The Disintegration-Reintegration cluster appears to be a recessive set of schemas for
him, whereas the Contact-Pseudo-Independent-Autonomy cluster
appears to be dominant. By using the percentile (%ile) column of
Sam's profile, one can get a sense of his level of expression of the
schema relative to Carter's (chapter 4, this volume) consensual norms.
It is not clear what to make of Sam's profile on either an intrapsychic
or consensual level. However, his high Contact and Pseudo Independence schema relative to his other subscale scores suggest that Sam
uses a combination of denial, avoidance, and rationalization to cope
with racial information (see Table 3). This intrapsychic interpretation
is based on theoretical descriptions of Sam's highest schema. As
compared to Carter's normative group, Sam also tends to express
Contact (85th percentile) and Pseudo Independence (80th percentile)
more strongly than most people. However, even though Reintegration is weakly expressed relative to his other schemas, it is relatively
strong (60th percentile) when compared to others' expressions of the
schema. Thus, again based on theoretical descriptions of the relevant
schema, Sam's (presumed) denial and avoidance might be tin.ged with
some elements of own-group superiority and outgroup inferiority.
Also, in interpreting Sam's scores, findings from consensual construct-validity studies of the racial identity variables might be of
assistance in forming hypotheses about the meaning of Sam's scores.
For example, Tokar and Swanson (1991) found that Contact expressions (in combination with the other racial identity schemas) were
uniquely predictive of a weak inner sense of self and difficulty in
developing close meaningful relationships with others. Perhaps these
personality characteristics also describe Sam's characteristics with
respect to members of his own and/or other racial groups. Such
hypotheses would certainly be worth a clinician's exploring with him.
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Conclusions and Future Research Directions

The primary theme underlying the various sections of this paper
is the proposition that different measurement models-or at least
more flexible usage of existing models-may be required to establish
the psychometric properties of racial and etlmic identity personality
inventories. Especially different models may be needed for measures
intended to operationalize process models of race or culture than are
needed for content models.
An implicit assumption underlying process measures is that each
individual's interpretative and judgmental cognitive-affective processes are the real content of such measures. That is, the person's
idiosyncratic reactions to items are a part of the measurement process.
Much of what is measured by process measures is intrapsychic, and
mayor may not be linear in expression.
However, where cultural or racial content measures are concerned, domains of relevant values, customs, traditions, external to
the person do exist, and the person may use these external criteria to
make construct-relevant self-assessments. Therefore, it ought to be
possible to use classical measurement theory to construct homogeneous, psychometrically sound measures of content-specific constructs
such as the ethnic identity measures discussed previously. Nevertheless, the domain of behavior or other characteristics on which such
measures are based rarely has been specified. Moreover, as Phinney
(1990) noted, investigators have been somewhat remiss about investigating the psychometric properties of their measures.
Be that as it may, the measurement problems for racial identity
process measures and ethnic identity content measures are different.
In the case of ethnic identity measures as defined in this paper, many
researchers have simply not provided psychometric information about
their measures. Yet presumably this oversight could be easily remedied by using standard methods of exploring reliability (e.g., coefficient alpha, test-retest) and validity of measures.
However, in the case of process measures, the resolution of
measurement dilemmas might not be so easily accomplished because
researchers may have to become accustomed to interpreting summary
test scores and items within such scores differently than they have
heretofore. In their discussion of achievement tests, Snow an.d Lohman
(1989) make a distinction between "sign-trait" and "sampling" interpretations of such devices that is seemingly applicable to process
measures of racial identity. Accordingly, they suggest that those who
interpret test scores have tended to regard them as "signs" of some
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underlying "trait" rather than as "samples" of the person's relevant
mental structures or organizational processes.
When one entertains sampling as an option for explaining individuals' reactions to racial identity items, then a wide array of
methodologies become candidates for developing and interpreting
measures. In addition, to the alternate strategies discussed in the
present paper (e.g., cluster analysis, multidimensional scaling), Snow
and Lohman (1989) suggest that "any other method that sorts cognitive tasks [or racial reactions] into categories of closely related (i.e.,
similarly sampled) performances provides a map to guide further
cognitive [affective] psychological analysis" (p. 317).
Presently, researchers seem to be fixated on coefficient alpha,
inter-subscale correlations, and factor analysis as the only methodologies for developing racial identity measures and/or judging their
effectiveness. This closed-minded perspective frequently has led
them to discount their own findings in support of racial identity
theory (e.g., Swanson et aI., 1994; Yanico et aI., 1994). Perhaps the
issues raised in this paper can provide some directions for researchers
to assess the extent to which their measurement models fit the racial
or ethnic identity conceptual model being investigated.
Finally, some examples of the ways in which the racial identity
measures might be used to assess respondents' quality of race-related
behavior have been proposed. However, more empirical research
specifically focused on patterns, profiles, or clusters of racial identity
subscales and their relation to other attitudes, emotions, and behaviors is needed. This type of information would enhance the interpretative process by providing practitioners with the kinds of information
that could be used to assist clients in their racial identity adjustment.
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